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T

HIS is a study of contemporary American legislation concerning
probate courts, with particular reference to their jurisdiction over
the probate of wills and the administration of estates of deceased persons.
By the term "probate courts" is meant all judicial tribunals which
exercise such jurisdiction. As will subsequently appear, they are otherwise variously designated as surrogates' courts, orphans' courts, prerogative courts, courts of ordinary and county courts. In one state all
the functions of probate and administration are exercised by courts of
chancery. In other states, chancery has concurrent jurisdiction over
many of these functions. Sometimes the register of probate exercises
some of the functions of a probate court, while an orphans' or other
court acts in other probate matters. Again, two separate courts may each
• exercis; a part of the functions of a probate court. In one group of
sta.tes, probate and administration is merely a separate function of the
trial court of general jurisdiction or of its judge. But, regardless of its
name, every tribunal which exercises jurisdiction over the probate of
wills or the administration of decedents' estates, from its initiation to
the time of final distribution, is within the scope of this study.
In view of the great influence of the English pattern in the formative period of American probate law, we shall begin with a brief survey of the English system of probating wills and administering the
estates of deceased persons. This will be followed by a consideration
of the types of American probate court organizations, the subject matter
of their jurisdiction, and the personnel of these courts.
_
The subject of appellate procedure, as such, is not within the scope
of this discussion, but will be considered only as it tends to indicate the
character of original jurisdiction.
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I
SoME SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS OF THE ENGLISH LAW OF
DECEDENTS' ESTATES

A. Probate and Administration in England in the Eighteenth Century 1
It is not the purpose of this brief discussion of certain aspects of the
English law of decedents' estates to give a complete account of the entire course of its development. Rather its object is merely to present
enough of that development to explain the principal source from which
American probate law was drawn. While doubtless there were borrowings at an earlier period,2 the English probate law of the eighteenth
century is so typical of that which existed for a century before that a
consideration of its significant aspects will furnish us with an adequate
picture of the well from which much of our probate legislation was
drawn. Moreover, since there were few important changes in that law
up to the legislation of 1857,3 it is assumed that sources which describe
the English probate system of the early half of the nineteenth century
are equally pertinent to our study.
Matters pertaining to the administration of decedents' estates were
dealt with in three kinds of tribunals, namely, the ecclesiastical courts,
the common-law courts and chancery. Our study of English probate
law will discuss the functions of these courts in that order.
I.

Jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts

The jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts has been classified under
three general heads: -1 pecuniary causes, arising from "withholding
1 In general on this period see the following: Atkinson, "Brief History of English
Testamentary Jurisdiction," 8 Mo. L. REv. 107 (1943); REPPY AND ToMPKINs,
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF THE LAW OF WILLS, DESCENT AND
DISTRIBUTION, PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION (1928); REPORT BY THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE PRACTICE AND JURISDICTION OF THE EcCLESIASTICAL CouRTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1832); LANGDELL, BRIEF SURVEY OF
EQUITY JURISDICTION, 2d ed., 125-191 (1908) ;' l HoLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 625-630 (1922); MAITLAND, EQUITY, rev. ed., 248-276 (1936); WILLIAMS, EXECUTORS, 1st Am. ed., (1832); STORY, EQUITY JuRISPRUDENcE, 1st ed.
(1836); CoNsET, THE PRACTICE oF THE SPIRITUAL OR EccLESIASTICAL CouRTS
(1708); ToLLER, EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 2d Am. ed. (1824); BuRN's
EccLESIASTICAL LAW, 9th ed. by Phillimore (1842).
2 See Atkinson, "The Development of the Massachusetts Probate System," 42
MICH. L. REV. 425 (1943).
8 20-21 Viet., c. 77 (1857).
4 3 BLAcKST. CoMM. *88, *89.
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. ecclesiastical dues, or the doing or neglecting some act relating to the
church, whereby some damage accrues to the plaintiff"; matrimonial
causes; and testamentary causes, including "the probate of wills, the
granting of administrations, and the suing of legacies." 5 In matters
relative to wills and administration, the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical
courts was limited to the disposition of personal property. As to the
probate of wills and the granting of letters testamentary and letters
of administration, their jurisdiction was exclusive.
It would not be helpful in this connection to set forth in detail a
description of the bewildering varieties of ecclesiastical courts 6 having
jurisdiction, original or appellate, such as the diocesan courts, the prerogative courts, the court of arches, the court of peculiars and the court
of delegates. Suffice it to say· that the original jurisdiction as to decedents' estates was, in general, exercised by consistory courts of the
dioceses and the prerogative courts of Canterbury and Y ork.7 The
judge of the consistory court was called the ordinary judge, or merely
'the ordinary. 8 The deputy of the judge of an ecclesiastical court was
sometimes called the surrogate.9
The ecclesiastical courts were not courts of record.10 Just precisely
what is meant by a court of record is none too clear.11 Probably at the
present time its most important characteristic is its power to fine and
imprison. But, as Professor Holdsworth says: "It is the infallibility of
its formal record which is the earliest mark of a court of record." 12
Thus the decrees of an ecclesiastical court did not import the same infallibility as the judgment of the King's Bench. Moreover ( and this
may have had something to .do with the conclusion that it was not a
court. of ~ecord) it did not proceed according to the common law.
5

Id. *98.
HOLJ?SWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 598 (1922).
7
3 BLACKST. CoMM. *97.
8
3 BtJRN's EccLESIASTICAL LAw, 9th ed. by Phillimore, 39 (1842).
9
3 BuRN's EccLESIATICAL LAw, 9th ed. by Phillimore, 667 ( l 842) ; and see 3
STROUD's JUDICIAL DICTIONARY, 2d ed., 1996 (1903) quoting from Termes de la Ley
as follows: Surrogate "is he who is appointe'd in the stead of another, most commonly
of Bishop or his Chancellor."
6

a

10
11

l BAcoN's ABRIDGMENT, 5th ed., 558 (1786); 3 BLACKST. CoMM. *67.
5 HoLDSWoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 157 (1924); 3 BLAcKsT. CoMM.

*24; Stonex, "Courts of Record and Courts Not of Record," 31 CENTRAL L. J. 86
(1890).
.
0

12

5 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLIS~ LAW 158 (1924).
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Rather, its procedures were evolved from the civil and canon law, as
such strange terms as citation, libel or significavit might well indicate.18
When a person died testate, his executor could either have the will
probated in common form ( sometimes called noncontentious form) or
in solemn form. If he chose to prove it in common form, the procedure was simple, indeed. No notice or process was issued to anyone.
Strictly speaking, no actual evidence of the due execution of the will
was required. The will was admitted to probate on the oath of the
executor, which ordinarily amounted to nothing more than hearsay and
opinion. According to Conset,14 writing near the end of the seventeenth
century, the oath was as follows:
"You shall swear, that you believe this to be the last will and
testament of the deceased, and that you will pay all the debts and
legacies of the deceased, so far as the goods will extend, and law
shall bind you; and that you will cause all the said goods to be apprized, and make a true and perfect inventory of the said goods,
( at a day appointed by the judge, if none be then exhibited) and
likewise a true and just account of the said goods, when you shall
be thereto lawfully called. So help you God."
The will then at once being admitted to probate, letters testamentary were issued to the executor who proceeded to administer the personal estate of the testator.
At any time within thirty years the executor or some other interested party could have the will proved in soJemn form. This was
spoken of as the contentious procedure. Notice to interested parties was
given by citation; 15 the attesting witnesses were called and testified as
to the due execution of the will. The order admitting the will to
probate was binding on all parties who appeared in the proceeding or
who were cited.
Proceedings to administer the goods of a person who had died
intestate were similar in form. They might be either with or without
notice to interested parties. But Conset tells us that "if there is no
widow or relict of the deceased ( to whom the administration of the
goods of the intestate ought to be of course) then the nearest of kindred, coming to obtain letters of administration, must first have a cita13 In general as to procedure in an ecclesiastical court, see REPORT BY THE CoMMISSIONERs TO INQUIRE INTO THE PRACTICE AND JURISDICTION OFT.HE ECCLESIASTICAL
CouRTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES 14 (1832).
14
CoNSET, PRACTICE OF THE SPIRITUAL OR EccLESIASTICAL CouRTS, 3d ed., I 2
(1708). The first edition was dated 1681.
15
'
See note l 3, supra.
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tion against all and singular next of kindred of the deceased." 16 One
method of requiring notice, which might be employed either in the
case of a testate or of an intestate estate, was for an interested party to
file a paper known as a caveat. This required.notice to be given to the
caveator before any further steps could be taken in the case. Thus the
caveat might lead to the proof of the will in solemn form. It should
also be noted that the caveat could be filed before any other proceedings
had been taken with respect to the estate of the deceased. _
After the issuance of letters, there might be little or nothing more
in the way of judicial proceedings in the ecclesiastical court. It is true,
a statute of the reign of Henry VIII 11 required the personal representative to render an inventory of the goods of the deceased. And the
Statute of Distribution 18 required the administrator to give a bond to
render an inventory and to account. But it appears that this was not
always done. 19 Certainly there was no order of distribution such as is
common in American probate courts today. The personal representative
merely paid the debts and then distributed the residue to the legatees
or next of kin.
It should be pointed out that, thro~ghout its procedure, the ecclesiastical court conducted a case quite differently from a common-law
court. Oral testimony was not 'heard at the trial but depositions were
taken and were read by the judge previous to the hearing.20 Orders of
the court would ordinarily be enforced by excommunication only, or,
if this be ineffective, chancery might be asked to issue an attachment
so that the refractory party might be imprisoned until he obeyed the
order of the court. Review. of decisions of the ecclestiastical court was
by appeal, not by writ of error, and the appellate court could re-examine
questions of fact as well as of law and come to a decision de novo. 21
One other feature of the procedure in the ecclesiastical courts with
respect to decedents' estates should be noted. It appears that it was
relatively easy to secure the revocation, in the ecclesiastical court of
original jurisdiction, of an order admitting a will to probate or appoint16

CoNSET, PRACTICE OF THE SPIRITUAL OR EccLESIASTICAL CouRTS,

3d ed., 14

(1708).
17
21 Henry 8, c. 5, p. 167 (1529).
18
22-23 Car. 2, c. IO, p. 347 (1670).
19

2d Am. ed., 249,
ed., 1263-1265 (1832).

ToLLER, THE. LAW OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS,

492 (1824); 2

WILLIAMS, EXECUTORS,

1st

Am.

20 REPORT l3Y THE COMMISSIONERS TO lNQUJRE INTO THE PRACTICE AND JURIS-

WALES 19 (1832).
67-70 (1941).

DICTION OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS IN ENGLAND AND
21

PouND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN C1viL CASES
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ing an executor or administrator. 22 And even though the will had
been proved in solemn form, this did not prevent a revocation of
probate on a later hearing. 23

Jurisdiction of the Common-Law Courts
As has already been indicated, the ecclesiastical court had no jurisdiction over devises of land. That was ordinarily a matter for the
common-law courts.24 This does not mean that wills of land were probated in the common-law court, fo; they were not. But, with respect to
the land devised by it, a will was operative without any probate whatever. Title passed to the devisee immediately on the death of the testator, just as title passes to the grantee in a deed immediately upon its
delivery. If a will disposed of both personalty and realty, the action of
the ecclesiastical court, in admitting it to probate or in refusing to do so,
did not determine whether the will was a valid devise of real estate.
And, if a will disposed of real estate only, the ecclesiastical court had no
jurisdiction to admit it to probate. 25 When an heir or devisee wished
to test the validity of a devise of land, he brought some action to try
title, such as ejectment or trespass. Even a judgment in such an action
did not prevent further actions of ejectment or trespass in which the
validity of the will might be adjudicated anew.
Contract actions which survived the death of the decedent could be
brought in a court of common law, whether on behalf of or against the
decedent. 26 The personal representative could sue and be sued in his
representative capacity. Unless chancery interfered, a creditor of the
decedent might recover judgment against the executor or administrator in a court of law which was enforceable only against the goods of
the estate. Thus, the judgment would be "de bonis testatoris."
In the case of a specific legacy,21 such as a collection of silver plate or
a.n oil painting, the executor must first i'accept the legacy," that is perform some overt act indicating that the chattel was set aside for the
legatee. Then title vested in the legatee and he could bring an appropriate action at law, such as replevin or trover, to assert his rights in it.
2.

22

28

I

WILLIAMS, EXECUTORS, 1st Am. ed., 347, 359 (1832).

I WILLIAMS, EXECUTORS, 1st Am. ed., 359 (1832).

u 2 PAGE, WILLS, 3d ed.,§ 563 (1941).
ln the Goods of John Bootle, L. R. 3 P. & D. 177 (1874).
26
Atkinson, "Brief History of English Testamentary Jurisdiction," 8 Mo.
REv. 107 at 118, 121 (1943); LANGDELL, BRIEF SURVEY OF EQUITY JuR1sn1cnoN,
2d ed., 166, 167 (1908).
27
z W1LLIAMS, EXECUTORS, 1st Am. ed., 843 ff. (1832).
25

L.
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If, however, the legacy was general 28-that is a gift of a sum of
money-there was apparently a' difference of opinion as to whether an
action of assumpsit at law was proper, but it was eventually determined
that this could not be brought. The remedy was by action in the ecclesiastical court. And, if a legatee chose to file a bill to have the estate
administered in chancery, he could secure a determination of his rights
in that tribunal, regardless of the character of his legacy.20
Before concluding with the discussion of the function of the court of
law something should be ~aid about the use of the writ of prohibition.
If a party to a proceeding in the ecclesiastical court thought that court
·had exceeded its jurisdiction, he might obtain a writ of prohibition in
the common-law court.30 Since it was conceded (to use the language of
an early case) that the ecclesiastical courts "had but a lame jurisdiction," 81 these writs must have been frequently issued. For example,
the King's Bench had held that, after an inventory was exhibited, the
ecclesiastical court could e~tertain no objections to it by a creditor.82

3. Jurisdiction of Chancery
While the writs of prohibition crippled the jurisdiction of the
, ecclesiastical courts, the common-law courts from which they issued had
no machinery adapted to the administration of estates. The net result
was that chancery, with its more flexible procedure, tended more and
more to take over matters of administration. Though the will would
be admitted to probate and the personal representative appointed by the
ecclesiastical court, a creditor or distributee might filt; his bill to have
the estate administered in chancery. This jurisdiction might be sought
for the purpose of discovering assets, because a trust was involved, or,
though no actual trust was involved, because the estate was regarded
as a kind of trust fund and the personal representative as a kind of
trustee.88 But, for whatever reason jurisdiction was assumed, chancery
28
Atkinson, "Brief History of English Testamentary Jurisdiction," 8 Mo. L. REV.
107 at II9 (1943).
29
LANGDELL, BRIEF SURVEY OF EQUITY JURISDICTION, 2d ed., 154, ,157 (1908).
so Atkinson, "Brief History of English Testamentary Jt1risdiction," 8 Mo. L.
REv. 107 at 117 (1943).
·
'Ill Matthews v. Newby, I Vern. 133 at 134 (1682).
32
See 2 WILLIAMS, EXECUTORS, 1st Am. ed., 644, 645 (1832) and cases cited
therein.
38
I STORY, EQUITY JuRISPRUDENCE, 1st ed.,§§ 530 et seq. (1836); LANGDELL,
BRIEF SURVEY OF EQUITY JURISDICTION, 2d ed., Arts. VI and VII (1908); MAITLAND,
EQUITY, rev. ed., 248-257 (1936).
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ordinarily continued with the administration until it was complete.
Notices to creditors were published; actions by creditors in commonlaw courts were enjoined; assets were brought in an,d distributed to
creditors and legatees or next of kin.
And not only did chancery administ~r personalty of the decedent,
but it might also take charge of some or all of his real estate. Thus, if a
testator had devised his lands to his executor in trust for the payment
of debts, or for the payment of debts and legacies, the court of equity
would take charge of the land and administer it as directed by the
testator.84
Chancery never assumed the jurisdiction to probate a will or to
appoint an executor or administrator. But, as to all subsequent steps in
the process of administration, it might take jurisdiction if an interested
party filed a bill asking for it. The concurrent jurisdiction of the
ecclesiastical courts continued, it is true; but the chancery procedure
was regarded as so much more satisfactory that administration in equity
became a common practice.
Moreover, the chancery court might find itself confronted with a
question of the validity of a devise of land. The issue could arise
merely incidentally in connection with some related matter. Or the
parties might come into chancery solely for the purpose of establishing
the will and having the heir enjoined from interfering with the enjoyment of the devisee. Story thus describes the procedure in these
two situations :u

"If the will is of real estate, and its validity is contested in the
cause, the Court will, in like manner, direct its validity to be
ascertained, either by directing an issue to be tried, or an action of
ejectment to be brought at law; and will govern its own judgment by the final result. If the will is established in either case,
a perpetual injunction may be decreed.
"But, it is often the primary, though not the sole, object of a
suit in Equity, brought by devisees and others in interest, to establish the validity of a will of real estate. . . . In such cases the
jurisdiction, exercised by Courts of Equity, is somewhat analogous
to that exercised in cases of Bills of Peace. . . . In every case of
this sort, the Court will, unless the heir waives it, direct an issue of
devisavit vel non, (as it is technically, though, according to Mr.
34

Atkinson, "Brief History of English Testamentary Jurisdiction," 8 Mo. L.
REv. 107 at 119 (1943).
811
2 STORY, EQUITY JuRISPRUDENcE, 1st ed., 671 (1836).
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Woodeson, barbarously expressed,) to ascertain the valislity of the
will .... When, by this means upon a verdict the validity of the
will is fully established, the Court will, by its decree, declare it to
be well proved, and that it ought to be established, and will grant
a perpetual injunction."
-

B. Statutory Reform in English Probate Law and Administration

In the first half of the nineteenth century there were various evidences of dissatisfa\:tion with the existing system of probate as administered by the ecclesiastical courts. A commission appointed to
inquire into the practice and jurisdiction of· the ecclesiastical courts
recommended a number of reforms in its report in 1832.36 , The Fourth
Report of ·the Real Property Commissioners, filed in 1833, recommended the complete abolition of the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical
courts over testamentary matters.37 In 18 57 legislation was enacted
which actually provided for this important change. A statute enacted in
that year 88 established a court of probate presided over by a judge
having "rank and precedence with the Puisne Judges of Her Majesty's Superior Courts of common law at Westminster." This court was
designated as a court of record, and was vested with the voluntary and
contentious jurisdiction in relation to the granting or revoking probate
of wills and letters of administration. If a will disposed of both land
and chattels, probate was made conclusive as to real estate just as it
was with respect to chattels. It was provided, however, that the newly
established court of probate should have no jurisdiction as to suits for
legacies or
the distribution of residues. By the first Judicature
Act, 39 enacted in 1873 and effective in 1875, most of the various courts
were consolidated to form a single unified court known as the Supreme
Court of Judicature. This was composed of two parts, the High Court
of Justice and the Court of Appeal. The jurisdiction of the High Court
of Justice included jurisdiction formerly exercised by the Probate Court
and the High Court of Chancery, as well as the jurisdiction of other
courts. For administrative convenience; the High Court was divided
into the following division~: the Chancery Division; the King's Bench
Division; the Common Pleas Division; the Exchequer Division; the

for

136

REPORT BY THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE PRACTICE

AND JURISDICTION OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS IN ENGLANP AND WALES

(1832).

37 FouRTH REPORT BY THE CoMMISSIONERS To INQUIRE INTO THE LAw OF ENG-

65 (1832).
20-21 Viet., c. 77, p. 425 (1857).
36-37 Viet., c. 66, p. 191 (1873).

LAND RESPECTING REAL PROPERTY
38
39
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Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division. To the latter division was
assigned the jurisdiction formerly belonging to the Probate Court.
The Land Transfer Act of I 897 40 provided that "Probate and
letters of administration n;tay be granted in respect of real estate only,
although there is no personal estate." It was further provided by the
same enactment that the personal representative should hold title to
and administer the real estate of the decedent.
The Supreme Court of Judicature Act of I 92 5, as amended,41
provides for a High Court of Justice of three divisions, namely, the
Chancery Division, consisting of the Lord Chancellor and six puisne
judges; the King's Bench Division, consisting of the Lord Chief Justice
and nineteen puisne judges; and the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty
Division, consisting of a President and four puisne judges. A puisne
judge of the High Court must be qualified by being a barrister of ten
years standing. He receives a salary of £ 5000, except the Lord Chancellor, whose salary is £10,000 and the Lord Chief Justice, whose salary
is £8,000. Judges of the Court of Appeal receive the same salaries as
the Judges of the High Court.
Jurisdiction in the matter of decedents' estates is distributed among
the three divisions of the High <;:ourt in much the same fashion as it
was divided among the ecclesiastical courts, the court of chancery and
the common-law courts, prior to the act of 1857. The Probate Division
has exclusive jurisdiction of the probate of wills and the issuing of
letters. Actions at law for or against the personal representative may be
brought in the King's Bench Division. But administration may be
had in chancery after letters are granted. In that case, actions at law
against the personal representative would be stayed and creditors'
rights would be settled in connection with the administration in equity.
Appeals in matters of decedents' estates are taken from the High Court
to the Court of Appeals just as in other matters.
There is a concurrent jurisdiction to admit to probate and grant
letters in the county courts in the case of small estates,42 but judicial
statistics would seem to indicate that this has rarely been taken advantage of.43
40

60-61 Viet., c. 65, p. 184 (1897).
15-16 Geo. 5, c. 49, p. 1197 (1925); 25 Geo. 5, c. 2, p. 15 (1935); 1-2 Geo.
6, c. 2, p. 4 (1937); 1-2 Geo. 6, c. 67, p. 804 (1938); 4 HALSBURY, STATUTES OF
ENGLAND 146 with amendments in 28 id. 33, 30 id. 129 and 31 id. 84.
42
24-25 Geo. 5, c. 53, §§ 60, 61, p. 531 (1934).
48
CIVIL JUDICIAL STATISTICS, ENGLAND AND WALES, 1938, pp. 20, 21 (1939).
This report shows that in 1938 there were 121 contentious probate actions tried and
41
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It i~, of course, inconceivable that five judges could handle, alone
and unassisted, all the probate business for all the people of England.
In fact, judici~l statistics indicate that the great bulk of proceedings to
·admit wills to probate and for letters take the form of noncontentious
proceedings and are heard before probate registrars. 44 This is, obviously, an administrative matter which does not require, in most cases,
the actual personal supervision of the judge. But, of course, the judge
and the registrar are both a part of the unified judicial system, and
some judicial supervision is always possible where it is needed.
There are four probate registrars 45 assisted by a staff of clerks. In
addition, there are sixteen groups of district registrars, with a chief
registry in each group and certain subregistrars. To qualify as a probate
registrar, one must be a practicing barrister or solicitor of ten years
standing, or a district probate registrar of five years standing, or have
served ten years as a cler1c in the principal probate registry.
In considering the English system as a· whole, one cannot fail to
note the extensive changes that have taken place within the last 'hundred years. All matters of decedents' estates are now handled by one
court. There is no possibility of conflicting rulings by different courts
on questions of jurisdiction depriving a litigant of relief. This court
is not an inferior court as was the ecclesiastical court, but is a court of
general juri~diction, whose judges receive a salary comparable to that
of justices of the Sup~eme Court of the United States. The English
system, however, distinguishes sharply between contentious and noncontentious business of the court. The latter being largely of an administrative character, is handled by probate registrars and their assistants.
But if a contentious proceeding is necessary, either in the Chancery or
the King's Bench Division:, it may be heard by judges of the one great
trial court of general jurisdiction of England.
The separation of jurisdiction between the Probate Division and
· the Chancery Division would seem still to be a mark of inefficiency.
Indeed, in recent years there was an unsuccessful movement to transfer
the probate of wills and granting of letters to the Chancery Division.40
Nevertheless, since matters may be freely transferred from one division
258 motions heard by a judge. In noncontentious proceedings, in 1938, in the registries there were the following grants: 94,944 probates and letters of administration with
the will annexed; 54,808 letters of administration.
44
CIVIL JUDICIAL STATISTICS, ENGLAND AND WALES, 1938, p. 43 (1939)
45
8 HALsBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND, _"Courts," 2d ed.,§ 1320, p. 601 (1933).
46
Bus1NESS OF THE CouRTS CoMMIITEE, INTERIM REPORT (1933).
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of the High Court to another, it would seem that procedural difficulties
arising from this divided jurisdiction are not great. 47

II
DEVELOPMENT OF AN AMERICAN COUNTERPART OF ENGLISH
PROBATE JURISDICTION

A. The Transition Process
We have traced thus far the evolution of probate courts in England
from a system in which the complete -administration of an estate could
and frequently did require judicial proceedings in three courts to the
modern organization under which probate business is handled in a
single court-the High Court of Justice. We turn now to the establishment of probate courts in America. Some of the English historical
influences are to be noted in the early development of our own probate
court organizations. But mixed with these influences were some courageous attempts to establish one court possessing the combined powers of
the English ecclesiastical, common-law, and chancery courts. The objective was a system under which an entire probate proceeding could
be conducted and supervised, in one court, from the probate of a will
and grant of letters to the final distribution of the estate. Due to variations in populations, community needs, considerations of expense, and
natural local differences in opinion, different systems of probate courts
have developed.
In very early colonial times testamentary jurisdiction was commonly given to the General Courts or vested in the governors and their
councils. Somewhat later it was given to county or other trial courts
as they were established, although the General Courts frequently con.tinued to exercise some testamentary jurisdiction. By the middle of.
the seventeenth century numerous variations had developed in the
colonies.48
In some instances the governor was made the ordinary, although
it was common for him to commission deputies or surrogates to probate
wills and grant letters, reserving to himself supervisory control over
47
A large portion of probate business is handled in the Probate Division; and
recourse to the chancery and King's Bench Divisions yet remains for certain contentious
matters in the administration of decedents' estates. But all are in the same High Court
of Justice.
48
For a summary of these developments and variations, see PouNn, ORGANIZATION

OF COURTS

26-80 ( I 940).
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their ads by way of appeal.40 Orphans' courts were created in several
states to include jurisdiction over executors and administrators as well
as guardians. 50 Elsewhere probate jurisdiction was lodged in the
established courts-superior courts in some places,51 inferior courts in
others. 52
The first plan of having the governor appoint deputies or surrogates to probate wills and grant letters constituted but a slight departure from the practice of the English ecclesiastical courts. The creation
of separate orphans' courts with many of the powers possessed by all
three courts under the English system was a step in recognizing the
need for a unification of the processes of probate and administration.
And conferring this jurisdiction upon general trial courts already established served to unite probate jurisdiction with general judicial administration.
B. American Innovations

In observing the evolution of probate courts in America, three
aspects in their development are to be noted: the range of their powers,
the scope of their jurisdiction, and the particular forms assumed by
them.
The powers lodged in the various bodies, persons or courts were
extremely limited in the early stages of probate development. In many
cases they consisted merely of the power to probate wills and grant
letters, following the practice of the ecclesiastical courts. Very gradually these powers were extended to include a needed control and super49 Acts Passed by the General Assembly of the Colony of Georgia, 1755-1774,
published by Jones, 5 (1881); THE CoMPACT WITH THE CHARTER AND LAWS OF THE
CoLONY OF Nmv PLYMOUTH, edited by Brigham, 32 (1836); I Laws qf New Hampshire, 1679-1702, edited by Batchellor, 206-207 (act of 1687) (1904); Acts and Laws
of New Hampshire, 1696-1725, printed by Green, IOI (act of 1718) (1726); Acts
and Laws of New Hampshire, printed by Fowle, 205-206 (act of 1771) (1771); Acts
of the Province of New Jersey, printed by Bradford, 38 (act of 1713) (1732); I Laws
of New York, 1691-1751, printed by Parker, 14-15 (act of 1692) (1752); Laws of
North Carolina, edited by Potter, I 12 ( act of I 7 I 5) ( I 8 2 I) ; Acts and Laws of Rhode
Island, printed by James Franklin, 5-7 (act of 1663) (173(?); 7 Statutes at Large of
South Carolina, edited by McCord, 172 (act of 1721) ..
50
See notes 54-58 infra.
51
See notes 68-70 infra.
52 2 PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE CoLONY OF CONNECTICUT, 1665-1678, edited by
Trumbull, 39 (act of 1666) (1852) (county courts); I Laws of New Hampshire,
1679-1702, edited' by Batchellor, 206-207 (act of 1687) ( 1904); Complete. Revisal
of the Acts of Assembly of the Province of North Carolina, printed by Davis, 524-525
{act of 1773) (1773) {to probate wills, grant letters and determine controversies in
intestate estates in matters not involving more than £50).
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v1s1on over executors and administrators in their administration of
estates.53 But the process of increasing powers of control in probate
courts cannot' yet be called complete in any state. All too often resort
must be had to equity or common-law courts to sell land to pay debts,
to partition land in connection with distribution, to contest wills, to
construe them, or even to adjudicate contested claims against an estate.
In Pennsylvania,54 Maryland,55 Delaware,5° Virginia 57 and New
Jersey 58 separate orphans' courts were early established.
"The idea was taken from the Court of Orphans of the city of
London, which had the care and guai;dianship of children of deceased citizens of London in their minority, and could compel
executors and guardians to file inventories, and give securities for
their estates .... The Court of Orphans was one of the privileges
of that free city; and that the people of Pennsylvania might enjoy
the same protection, it was transplanted into our law, at first without any change of name, but afterwards called the Orphans' Court.
The beginnings of this court were feeble. But it grew in importance with the increase of wealth and population, was recognised
in our Constitution of r 776, and in each of our subsequent con53

For substantiation of this development in particular states see opinion of Daly,
in Brick's Estate, 15 Abb. Pr. 12 (N.Y. 1862); opinion of Werner, J., in Matter
of Runk, 200 N.Y. 447, 452-456, 94 N.E. 363 (1911); REDFIELD, SURROGATES'
COURTS IN NEW YoRK, 4th ed., 1-17 (1890); Atkinson, "The Development of the
Massachusetts Probate System," 42 M1cH. L. REv. 425 (1943); opinion of Woodward,
J., in Horner & Roberts v. Hasbrouck, 41 Pa. 169, 177-179 (1862); REPPY and
ToMPKINs, H1STORICAL AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF THE LAw OF WILLS, 174177 (1928) (for New Jersey); l WOERNER, AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d
ed., 478,489 (1923).
H Act of 1713, in I Laws of Pennsylvania, 1700-1781, edited by Dallas, 98
( I 797). See also Abridgment of Laws of Pennsylvania, I 700-1 8 II, edited by Purdon,
407 ( I 8 l l). This act reestablished orphans' courts which had been discontinued in
Pennsylvania. Reference to their existence as early as 1693 may be found in I Charters
and Acts of Assembly of the Province of Pennsylvania, printed by Miller, app., p. 9
(1762).
55
Laws of Maryland, printed by Green, c. 8 (act of February, 1777); id. c. 9
(act of October, 1777) (1777).
66
Act of 1721 in l Laws of Delaware, 1700-1797, printed by Samuel and John
Adams, 8 7-94 ( l 797). Later references to orphans' courts in Delaware may be found
in an act of 1742, in Laws of the Government of New-Castle, Kent, and Sussex upon
Delaware, printed by B. Franklin, 273-282 (1751) entitled "An Act for the better
Settling Intestates' Estates."
57
For a statute providing for the annual holding of an orphans' court in Lunenburg County, Virginia, see Act of 1748 in 6 Statutes at Large of Virginia, edited by
Hening, 210 (1819).
58
Act of 1846. See Nixon's Digest of the Laws of New Jersey, 1709-1855, p.
550 (1855).
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stitutions, and has been the subject of innumerable Acts of Assembly." 59
Thus a jurisdiction over the persons and estates of minors came to
include the administration of decedents' estates. Elsewhere guardianship and curatorship (or conservatorship, as it is sometimes called) has
been appended to probate jurisdiction. And in many states there has
been added adoption proceedings, change of name, solemnization of
marriages, and even the granting of divorces. More closely connected
with the administration of estates, the administration of state inheritance or transfer taxes, supervision of testamentary trusts, and more
recently of inter vivos trusts, have been added. The extent of these
superimposed functions will be discussed later.
From the summary already given it is apparent that there was no
general agreement as to the form of tribunal for the administration of
estates. This function, bestowed upon the town councils by Rhode
Island, remains there to this day, although each council may elect a
probate judge to preside in the local probate courts.60 Probate judges
are still appointed by the governor in New Hampshire,61 following the
early practice when the governor appointed commissioners to probate
wills.62 The surrogates in New York and New Jersey, originally appointed by the governor or prerogative court,63 are now elected by the
electors of each county.64 In New York the extent of their powers and
scope of their jurisdiction have been vastly increased. New Jersey, on
the contrary, has restricted the surrogate to the :probate of wills and
grant of letters only when there is no contest; 65 id case of contest and
in most other matters resort must be had to the orphans' or prerogative
Jourt. 66 The separate orphans' courts early established in Pennsylvania,
Maryland and Delaware, and later in New Jersey, are still continued. 67
59

From the opinion of Woodward, J., in Horner & Roberts v. Hasbrouck, 41

Pa. 169 at 178 (1861).
60
61

R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. (1938) c. 568, § 3.

N.H. Const., arts. 46, 73•
1 Laws of New Hampshire, 1679-1702, edited by Batchellor, 206 (act of
1687). (1904).
63
See Brick's Estate, 12 Abb. Pr. Rep. 12 at 24-28 (N.Y. 1862); and In the
Matter of Coursen's Will, 4 N.J. Eq. 408 at 413-414 (1843).
64
N.Y. Const., art. 6, § 13; N.J. Const., art. 7, § 2, par. 5.
65
N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §§ 3:2-22, 3:7-5.1.
66
N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §§ 3:2-22; 3:7-5.1; 3:7-23.1; 3:27 to 3:32; (Supp.
1941-43) 3 :7-13.4; 3 :7-13.5.
61
Pa. Const., art. 5, § 22; Md. Const., art. 4, § l; Del. Const., art. 4, §§ 1,
33; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) § 2:7-1.
62
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And the separate probate courts established elsewhere have in the main
persisted.
But significant innovations were launched in three states. As early
as 1721 South Carolina conferred upon its county and precinct courts
"full power to determine the right of administration of the estates of
persons dying intestate . . . and also all disputes concerning wills and
executorships, in as full and ample manner as the same have-or might
have been heretofore determined by any Governor, or Governor and
Council." 68 In 1778 Georgia conferred jurisdiction upon its superior
courts "to determine in all matter_s of dispute concerning the proving
of wills and granting letters of administration." 69 In 1773 North Carolina conferred jurisdiction upon its superior courts in "a11 Suits and
.Matters relative to Legacies, :filial Portions, Estates of Intestates." 10
Here in courts of general jurisdiction, compounded with civil and
criminal jurisdiction, was the administration of estates. However, this
plan of conferring powers of probate and administration upon courts
of general jurisdiction was not to be permanent in any of these three
states.71 It remained for other states to initiate a movement which
would unite probate jurisdiction with law and equity.
One minor phenomenon of consolidation occurred early, however,
which has had an unfortunate effect upon probate courts. Under the
stress of quantity of judicial business the establishment of inferior
county courts with a limited civil and criminal jurisdiction was common.
Probate powers were added to their jurisdiction in several states. 72 In
thirteen states 73 at the present time probate matters come' under the
jurisdiction of county courts. Often these courts are presided over by
68
7 Statutes at Large of South Carolina, edited by McCord, 172 (Act of 1721)
(1840).
69
Digest of the Laws of Georgia to 1799, edited by Watkins, 226 (1800).
7
°Complete Revisal of all the Acts of Assembly of the Province of North Carolina, printed by Davis, 5II (1773). See also Laws of North Carolina, edited by
Iredell, 296-297 (Act of 1777) (179r).
71
In South Carolina the office 9f ordinary was established in l 799. See Acts
of South Carolina, 1795-1804, printed by Faust, 315 (1808).

In Georgia probate powers were vested in a register of probate appointed by the
legislature in each county beginning in 1777. Georgia Constitution of 1777, compiled by Marbury & Crawford, art. 52 (1802). See also REDFEARN, WILLS AND
ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN GEORGIA 153 (1938).
North Carolina conferred probate powers upon county courts in 1837. Laws
of North Carolina, 1836-37, printed by Lemay, 55 (1837).
72
PouND, ORGANIZATioN oF CouRTS 83-85, 137 (r940).
78
Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
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judges who are untrained in law. As a consequence their decisions are
usually reviewable on appeal by a trial de novo in courts of general
jurisdiction. Certainly this fusion of probate courts with county courts
has not produced any elevation of probate courts in the public esteem.
On the contrary, it has undoubtedly been a factor in minimizing the
importance of probate matters.

III
CLASSIFICATION OF AM.ERICAN PROBATE COURTS

A. Variations of Probate Court Organization in the Same State
Before attempting a classification of present-day probate courts, it
should be emphasized that the system of probate courts in several states
is not unitary and hence not susceptible of a single classification. Under
some systems two separate tribunals have been created to supervise the
complete administration of an estate. In other states different kinds of
tribunals exist in different counties of the same state for administering
probate matters. Where either of these situations exist, each court or
kind of court must be considered separately in the appraisal to follow,
and may require one, two, or even three classifications for the probate
courts of a single state.
I.

Probate courts as single or multiple units

In a number of states certain remnants of the tri-court system under
the English ecclesiastical practice still persist. The New Jersey system
. suggests considerable early English influence. Its intricacies can only
be appreciated by a detailed description. Three courts have probate
jurisdiction: the surrogate's court, the orphans' court and the prerogative court. There is one prerogative court for the entire state presided
over by the chancellor sitting as ordinary or surrogate general.74 There
is one surrogate in each county 75 and also one orphans' court in each
county.76 The surrogate is both the judge and clerk of his own court; 11
he is also clerk cif the orphans' court. 78 The prerogative court has- jurisdiction throughout the state to probate wills, grant letters and to hear
74

N.J.
N.J.
76
N.J.
77
N.J.
78
N.J.
75

Const., art. 6, § 4, par. 2.
Rev. Stat. (1937) § 2:7-12.
Rev. Stat. (1937) § 2:7-1.
Rev. Stat (1937) § 2:31-4, 2:31-16.
Rev. Stat. (1937) § 2:7-4.
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and finally determine disputes that arise thereon. 79 The surrogate of
each county also has power to probate wills and grant letters except
when doubt appears on the face of a will or a caveat is filed against a
will or a dispute or contest arises as to the existence of a will or the
right to letters.80 In any of these cases the matter is transferable to the
orphans' court. 81 In general the orphans' courts have no original jurisdiction to probate wills or grant letters. Their sole jurisdiction to do so
arises on transfer from the surrogate in case the matter is disputed or
contested.82 The orphans' courts also have power to grant allowances
to widows and children pending a will contest,83 to determine heirship
of an intestate where real estate is involved,8¼ to approve compromises
of will contests or claims of the estate against a third person,85 to order
the sale of real estate for the payment of debts, 86 determine rights of
beneficiaries under a will or of the next of kin in an estate,87 and determine controversies respecting allowances of accounts. 88 In short, the
jurisdiction of the surrogate is limited to the probate of wills and issuance of letters in nonadversary proceedings. The remainder of the
administration is had in the orphans' court. The probate of a will may
be either before the surrogate of the proper county or in the prerogative
court. 89 Thus, if a proceeding is initiated before the local surrogate,
the services of the orphans' court will certainly be required; but if a
proceeding is initiated in the prerogative court in the first instance that
court has power to conduct the entire proceeding.
In North Carolina there is a similar division of probate jurisdiction
between the clerk of the superior court and the superior court itself.
Indeed the clerk is himself a court 110 and handles most of the details
of administration. However, in the case of a contest on probate of a
will or grant of letters, the matter is transferred to the superior court
79

N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) § 3:1-1.
N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §§ 3:2-22 and 3:7-5.1.
81
lbid.
82
Ibid.
83
N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) § 3:2-29.
HN.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §§ 3:4-1 to 3:4-3.
85
N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) § 3:15.
86
N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) § 3:25-23.
81
N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §§ 3:26-2, 3:26-6.
88
N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) § 3:1-2.
89
N.J. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1938-40) § 3:2-3.
90
N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1943) §§ 2-1, 28-1; Edwards v. Cobb, 95
N.C. 4 (1886). For a statement of the history of this allocation of probate jurisdiction
see Hardy & Co. v. Turnage, 204 N.C. 538, 168 S.E. 823 (1933).
80

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 42

for the hearing. 9 1. The clerk may order the sale of personal property,92
but resort must be had to the superior court for the sale of land.93 Also
the clerk has jurisdictidn with respect to the inventory and accounting. 94
Much the same division of jurisdiction prevails in Virginia. The clerk,
as well as the court, has power to probate wills and grant letters.95 But
any decision of the clerk may be appealed to the circuit court or its
equivalent. 96 Probably the clerk doe~ not have as much power as the
clerk in North Carolina. It is sufficient to note, however, that in both
of these states the clerk has judicial powers and shares with the court
of general jurisdiction the control over the administration of estates.
Likewise in Delaware the register of wills in each county has power to
probate wills, grant letters, remove representatives, approve bonds,
pass upon accounts and settlements of representatives and to grant discharges.97 But a proceeding to sell land to pay debts must be had in
the orphans' courts. 98 Pennsylvania also has a register in each county
who· has power to probate wills and grant letters.99 Other matters in
connection with the administration of an estate _are handled in the
orphans' court.100
The important thing to observe in all these cases is the division
of jurisdiction between two tribunals. The first of these, variously
called the surrogate, the register of wills, or the clerk, performs a
function limited for the most part to the probate of wills and grant of
letters; .and, under the practice of some states, only when the matter
is not contested. In other states, such as Delaware, the register of wills
has quite broad powers, making it possible for most of the administration to be done under his supervision. The second of these tribunals,
variously called the orphans', the superior, district, or circuit court,
supervises the remainder of the administration and especially in matters
91

N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1943) § 28-30.
N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1943) §§ 28-73 to 28-80.
93
N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1943) § 28-81.
94
N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1943) §§ 28-50, 28-117, 28-118.
95
Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) §§ 5247, 5249.
96
Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) § 5249.
97
Del. Rev. Code (1935) §§ 3799, 3804, 3807, 38II, 3813, 3844 and 3866.
98
Del. Rev. Code ( l 93 5) c. 99. By means of appeal from the register's court,
most other matters can be heard in the orphans' court. Del. Rev. Code (1935) §§
3835, 3843; Del. Const., art. 4, § 34. But appeals from certain other matters lie
directly to the superior court. Del. Rev. Code (1935) §§ 3827, 3866.
99
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, § 1861.
100
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, §§ 2241 through 2254.
92
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that are more likely to be contentious or involve more than ministerial
functions.
In several other stat~s the clerk of the probate court has power to
admit wills to probate and grant letters on exceptional occasions,101
such as in the absence of the judge or in vacation of the court, but these
are regarded as extraordinary rather than ordinary powers.
2.

Different kinds of probate courts in the same state

From the very beginning there was a tendency to establish a probate court in each county. 102 But variations in population and considerations of expense have led to the establishment of different kinds of
probate courts within the same state:
In Indiana probate jurisdiction has been conferred upon the circuit
courts of each county.103 However, in Marion and Vanderburgh counties, two populous counties of the state, separate probate courts have
been established to handle the administration of estates. 10"' These probate courts are separate from the cir.cuit courts of these counties but are
fully coordinate with them.
In Oregon the county courts have been given probate jurisdiction; 105 but, in counties having a population of over 30,000, county
courts have been abolished and county judges made circuit judges to
preside over the "department of probate" in the circuit courts of those
counties.106 The probate courts in these larger counties are not unlike
those in Indiana except that the former may be said to be an integral
part of the court of general jurisdiction, rather than coordinate with it.
In New Mexico the district court has had concurrent jurisdiction
with the probate court in all probate matters since I 941 101 and any
estate of $2,000 or more may be "appealed" [transferred] to the district court.108 Thus probate jurisdiction is optional in either of two
courts.
In Alabama the probate court does not have exclusive jurisdiction.
Administration in equity remains optional; 109 or a proceeding com101

102

See discussion under VII B, infra.

136, 250 (1940).
Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 4-3-03.
10
"' Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §§ 4-2901, 4-3001.
105
Ore. Const., art. 7, § 12.
106
Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) §§ 93-310, 13-206, 13-207, 13-209.
101
N.M. Stat. Ann (1941) § 16-312.
108
N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) §§ 16-419, 16-420.
100
Ala. Const.? art. 6, § 149.
108
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menced in the probate 'court may be removed to the circuit court.110
Thus probate jurisdiction in Alabama is possible in any one of three
courts, each of which has adequate and compl~te power to function.
, In Tennessee probate jurisdiction is vested in the county courts
composed of all the justices of the peace of the county.111 Judicial
powers are exercised by the chairman who is, in effect, the probate
judge.112 However, when no person has applied or can be procured to
administer upon an estate, chancery has jurisdiction to appoint a representative after six months. 113 A proceeding to sell real estate may be
had either in the county, the circuit, or the chancery court.114 Appeals
from the county court ordinarily lie to the circuit court,115 but to the
court of appeals or the supreme court if jurisdiction in the particular matter appealed from is concurrent with the circuit or chancery
courts.116
In .Vermont most appeals from the probate court go to the county
court,117 but an appeal on a question of law goes directly to the supreme
court.118 In this one respec.t the probate courts of Vermont require a
double classification.
In Wisconsin probate jurisdiction has been vested in the county
courts throughout the state.119 The judges of these county courts, however, must be members of the bar except in counties having a population
of less than 14,000 in which case they may be lay judges.120 Appeals
from county courts in counties having a population of more than 15,000
go directly to the supreme court and are heard upon the record of the
proceedings below, but in counties having a population of 15,000 or
less ( of which there are some twelve counties) appeals lie to the circuit
court and are heard de novo.121
Ohio provides for separate probate courts in each county, but counties of less than 60,000 population are authorized to "consolidate" their
probate court with the local court of common pleas, such "consolidated
110

Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit.13, §§ 138 through 144.
Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) §§ 10193, 10225.
112
Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) §§ 10202, 10204.
113
Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) § 8155.
114
Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) § 10226.
116
Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) §§ 9028, 9060.
116
Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) §§ 9029, 9059.
117
Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) § 3002.
nsvt. Pub. Laws (1933) § 3001.
119
Wis. Stat. (1943) § 253.01.
120
Wis. Stat. (1943) § 253.02.
121
Wis. Stat. (1943) § 324.01.
111
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court" to be presided over by the judge of the common pleas court.122
This does not operate to extinguish the probate court but merely to
provide for a unified personnel.128 Appeals from probate courts in Ohio
go directly to a court of appeals, provided that a record has been made
of the probate proceedings; but if a record has not been taken of the
proceedings an appeal lies to the court of common pleas of that county,
where there is a trial de novo.124 It is a matter of common knowledge
among lawyers in Ohio that parties avail themselves of this second trial
in the common pleas courts in most cases. Where there has been a
"consolidation" of the probate courts with common pleas courts,· this
may mean a trial de novo before the same judge--a useless and futile
gesture, it would seem. But because of this variation in the method of
appeal, the probate courts of Ohio occupy two positions in the hierarchy
of courts.
A similar "consolidation" of courts exists also in New York and
Pennsylvania. Separate surrogates' courts in New York and separate
orphans' courts in Pennsylvania exist in every county.125 But in counties
of less than 40,000 population in New York the county judge also
presides over the surrogate court of that county, whereas in counties
having a larger population the legislature may provide for a separate
surrogate.126 Similarly in counties of not more than 150,000 population
in Pennsylvania the common pleas judge presides over the orphans'
court, but in larger counties the legislature must, and in any other
county may, establish separate orphans' courts.121 In both of these states
the courts performing probate functions are distinct. The "consolidation," as in Ohio, is one of judicial personnel, prompted in each case
by economical considerations in the less populous communities.

B. Norms to Be Applied in A~alyzing American Probate Jurisdiction
Up to this point we have considered the multiple character of probate court organization in some stat-es and the variations of organization
122
Ohio Const., art. 4, § 7; Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937) §§ 10501-4,
10501-47.
128
State ex rel. Sattler v. Cahill, 122 Ohio St. 354, 171 N.E. 595 (1930).
m Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, Supp. 1943) § 10501-56.
125
N.Y. Const., art. 6, § 13; Pa. Const., art. 5, § 22.
126
N.Y. Const., art. 6, § 13.
127
Pa. Const., art. 5, § 22. As to the counties in which the legislature has estab~
lished separate orphans' courts to be presided over by separate orphans' judges, see Pa.
Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, §§ 2083, 2641, 2661, 2681, 2701 and Pa. Stat.
Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1943) tit. 20, §§ 2706, 2723a, 2731.
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in the same state. It is now our purpose to classify all probate court
organizations on the basis of their most important characteristics. Before doing this, however,· it is desirable to discuss the norms to be
applied in making this cl~ssification.
Probate courts have been variously classified as courts of "limited,"
"inferior," "special and limited," ('limited though not special," or
"limited though not inferior" jurisdiction; and also as courts of "general," "superior" or "coordinate" jurisdiction.128 These descriptives
are not only inconsistent but are likely to represent but partial views.
It is true that their predecessors, the ecclesiastical courts, were not
courts of general jurisdiction.129 Nor were they courts of record. Nevertheless, they were "courts," and their judgments were subject to
.recognition and obedience through the process of excommunication.~ 0
The establishment of probate courts in America was made without any
such limitations on their powers.131 Nevertheless, a number of reasons
have contributed to their characterization as "inferior" in certain respects.
As will be seen from the discussion which follows, it is not easy
to classify probate courts under our systems of court organization. By
creating them and giving them power to probate wills and supervise
the administration of estates, we have set off to them a specialized
function. Because of this specialized task assigned to them, we have
been inclined to call them courts of "special or limited jurisdiction,"
and, therefore, of "inferior jurisdiction." 132 Upon a little consideration, it will be seen that this conclusion is not warranted. In giving this .
jurisdiction to the probate courts, we have in the same process not given
it to. the general trial courts which we call "courts of general jurisdiction." In matters probate, therefore, probate courts truly have "general
jurisdiction."
To courts of general jurisdiction, we have indulged a presumption
in favor of the regularity of their proceedings and the validity of their
judgments. No such presumption is made in the case of courts of in128

See references cited in 1 WoERNER, AMERICAN LAw OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d
ed., 484 (1923); l CLEAVELAND, HEWI'IT and CLARK, PROBATE LAW AND PRACTICE
OF CONNECTICUT 132 (1929).
129
l WoERNER, AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., § 140 (1923).
1110

3 BLACKST. COMM. *101. 1 WoERNER, AMERICAN LAw OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., 481 (1923).
132
For an early example of this type of reasoning, see Strouse v. Drennan, 41
Mo. 289 at 297 (1867).
181
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ferior jurisdiction.188 In actions at law, general trial courts have general'
jurisdiction. In probate matters it can equally be said that trial courts
do not have, but that probate courts do have, general jurisdiction. In
these respective field~, it should be clear that each court is a court of
original jurisdiction, not superior or inferior in the first instance, as to
any other court. Despite this seemingly simple statement, there has
not been general agreement that a probate court is one of general jurisdiction within its field of operation. Indeed, the constitution of Missouri at one time provided that "inferior tribunals shall be established
in each county for the transaction" of probate matters.18 ,1 By the same
constitution, they were also made courts of record. Despite the inferiority intended for them, it was held that "their jurisdiction pertaining to wills and administrators is general ... and the same may be
said of the circuit court; but their action, on subjects exclusively and
originally confided to them, is entitled to the same weight as that of
any other court of record.mas Thus, despite the commands of the constitution, probate courts in Missouri were held courts of general jurisdiction within a defined sphere and their jurisdiction "as general as that
of the circuit court." Accordingly, their proceedings and judgments
operating upon subjects within a defined sphere were entitled to the
same presumptions of regularity and validity as those of courts of general jurisdiction.
The inferior position accorded to probate courts historically has left
its indelible mark upon the e:ffect accorded to their proceedings. The
rule was early, developed that "inferior jurisdictions and special authorities, must show their jurisdiction, and must pursue their authority
strictly." 186 The result has been that every stage of a probate proceeding must laboriously recite each fact upon which its jurisdiction is
predicated. Otherwise a sale or judgment is void and is subject to
collateral attack--a vulnerability well known to every title examiner.
The resulting blemish upon laud titles and consequent relitigation of all
the matters supposedly concluded in the probate court are facts too well
known to require comment. After this rule became well intrenched,
188

For a concise summary of this doctrine and its origin, see I WoERNER,
AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., § 143 (1923).
184
Mo. Const. of 1820, art. 5, § 12.
us Johnson v. Beazley, 65 Mo. 250 at 256 (1877). See also Schultz v. Schultz,
IO Gratt. (51 Va.) 358, 377-379 (1853).
186
Morrow v. Weed, 4 Iowa 79 at 124 {1856). This case contains an excellent
statement of the foundations of this doctrine, its unfortunate consequences, and a
resume of the authorities at that date.
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remedial measures were commenced. First probate courts were made
courts of recor9-. Then presumptions were made as to the regularity,
of their proceedings and validity of their judgments. The importance
of these two steps cannot be overstated.
By statute in a number of states at the present time proceedings of
probate courts are now accoi::ded the same presumptions of regularity
and validity as those of courts of general jurisdiction.187 Elsewhere
such, a presumption has been ~ade even in t~e absence of statute.1118
137
Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 13, § 278; Idaho Code Ann. (1932) § 1-1203;
Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1932,) c. 215, § 2; N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 16-411;
N.D. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913) § 8533; Pa. Stat. A;nn. (Purdon, 1930) tit 20, §
· 2085; R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. (1938) c. 573, § 8; S.D. Code Ann. (1939) § 35.0105;
Utah Code Ann. (1943) § 102-14-15.
·
138
Arizona. Varnes v. White, 40 Ariz. 427 at 431, 12 P. (2d) 870 (1932);
Arkansas: Massey v. Doke, 123 Ark. 211, 185 S.W. 271 (1916); Graham v.
Graham, 175 Ark. 530, 1 S.W. (2d) 16 (1927);
California. ,Luco v. Commercial Bank, 70 Cal. 339, I I P. 650 (1886);
Burris v. Kennedy, 108 Cal. 331 at 338, 41 P. 458 (1895);
Georgia. Stanley v. Metts, 169 Ga. 101, 149 S.E. 786 (1929); Wood v.
Crawford, 18 Ga. 526 (1855);
·
Illinois. Ill. Merchants' Trust Co. v. Turner, 341 Ill. IOI, 173 N.E. 52 (1930);
Housh v. People, 66 Ill. 178 (1872); People v. Cole, 84 Ill. 327 (1876); People
v. Gray, 72 Ill. 343 (1874); Matthews v. Hoff, 113 Ill. 90 (1885);
Indiana. Sims v. Gay, 109 Ind. 501, 9 N.E. 120 (1886);
Iowa. McFarland v. Stewart, 109 Iowa 561, So N.W. 657 (1899);
Kansas. Denton v. Miller, IIO Kan. 292, 203 P. 693 (1922);
Kentucky. Goss' Exr. v. Ky. Refining Co., 137 Ky. 398, 125 S.W. 1061 (1910);
Michigan. Church v. Holcomb, 45 Mich. 29, 7 N.W. 167 (1880); Chapin v.
Chapin, 229 Mich. 515, 201 N.W. 530 (1924);
.
Minnesota. Davis v. Hudson, 29 Minn. 27, I I N.W. 136 (1881); •
Mississippi. Gillespie v. Hauenstein, 72 Miss. 838, 17 So. 602 (1895);
Missouri. Johnson v. Beazley, 65 Mo. 250 (1877); Desloge v. Tucker, 196 Mo.
587 at 601, 94 S.W. 283 (1906);
Nebraska. Foote v. Chittenden, 106 Neb. 704 at 707, 184 N.W. 167 (1921);
New. Hampshire. Kimball v. Fisk, 39 N.H. 110 (1859);
New Jersey. Plume v. Howard Savings Inst., 46 N.J.L. 211 (1884) (as to
orphans' court);
New York. Van Deusen v. Sweet, 51 N.Y. 378 (1873); Bearns v. Gould, 77
N.Y. 455 (1879); Harrison v. Clark, 87 N.Y. 572 (1882); O'Conner v. Huggins,
113 N.Y. 5n (1889);
Ohio. Shroyer v. Richmond, 16 Ohio St. 455 (1866);
Oklahoma. Hunter v. Wittier, 120 Okla. 103, 250 P. 793 (1926); Drum v.
Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 189 Okla. 30,7, II6 P. (2d) 715 (1941);
Oregon. Russel v. Lewis, 3 Ore. 380 (1872); Slate's Estate, 40 Ore. 349, 68
P. 399 (1902);
South Carolina. Clark v. Neves, 76 S.C. 484, 57 S.E. 614 (1906);
Tennessee. Townsend v. Townsend, 44 Tenn. 70 (1867);
Texas. Reeves v. Fuqua, (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) 184 S.W. 682; Jones v. Sun
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In Connecticut, Florida, Maine, .Maryland, Vermont and Wisconsin,
however, no such presumption is indulged. 189 This presumption, according to the judicial acts of prgbate courts the same force and effect
as to those of courts of general jurisdiction, represents a noteworthy
and important step in their development.
A second important test of a court's position in any judicial organization is whether .it has been ·made a "court of record." Most, but not
all, probate courts in this country have been created or subsequently
made courts of record.140 This being true, and, since all courts of genOil Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) 145 S.W. (2d) 615 reversed on other grounds, 137
Tex. 353, 153 S.W. (2d) 571 (1941); Tucker v. Imperial Oil and Development Co.,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1921) 233 S.W. 339;
Virginia. Saunders v. Link, 114 Va. 285, 76 S.E. 327 (1912);
Washington. In re Upton's Estate, 199 Wash. 447, 92 P. (2d) 210 (1939);
Christianson v. King County, 239 U.S. 356, 36 S. Ct. 114 (1915);
West Virginia. State ex rel. Conley v. Thompson, 100 W. Va. 253, 130 S.E.
456 (1925};
Wyoming. Lethbridge v. Lauder, 13 Wyo. 9, 76 P. 682 (1904).
139
Co11111ecticut. Palmer v. Palmer, (D.C. Conn. 1940) 31 F. Supp. 861;
Florida. State ex rel. Everette v. Petteway, 131 Fla. 516, 179 So. 666 (1938),
135 Fla. 757, 185 So. 619 (1939);
Maine. Appeal of Waitt, (Me. 1943) 34 A. (2d) 476;
Maryland. Talbot Packing Corp. v. Wheatley, 172 Md. 365, 190 A. 833
(1937};
Vermont. Probate Court v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of No. America, 106 Vt. 207,
171 A. 336 (1934); Abbott v. Abbott, (Vt. 1943) 28 A. (2d) 375.
Wisconsin. Estate of Anson, 177 Wis. 441, 188 N.W. 479 (1922); Estate of
Ott, 228 Wis. 462, 279 N.W. 618 (1938). This last Wisconsin case is based on
Wis. Stat. (1943) § 310.045 which requires the petition for letters to allege and the
order to find the facts necessary to the jurisdiction of the court. But see Wis. Stat.
(1943) § 316.33 which prevents the invalidation of a sale by a representative except
for causes that would invalidate it had it been made pursuant to an order of a court
of general jurisdiction.
140
Ala. Const., art. 6, § 148; Ariz. Const., art. 6, § IO; Cal. Const., art. 6, § 12;
Colo. Const., art. 6, § 23; Fla. Stat. Ann. (1943) §§ 36.02, 36.14, 732.07; Idaho
Const., art. 5, § 2 I ; Ill. Const., art. 6, § I 8; Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1941) c.
37, §§ 171, 299; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §§ 4-324, 4-2902, 4-3002; Iowa
Code (Reichmann, 1939) § 10761; Kan. Const., art. 3, § 8; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann.
(Corrick, Supp. 1943) § 59-301; La. Const., art. 7, § 35; Me. Rev. Stat. (1930)
c. 75, § I; Md. Const., art. 4, § I; Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1932) c. 215, § 1;
Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943) § 27.3178 (26); Minn. Const., art. 6, § 7; Mo. Const.,
art. 6, § 34; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942) § 1990; Mont. Const., art. 8, § 25; Neb.
Const., art. 5, § 16; Nev. Const., art. 6, § 8; Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, 1929) §
8403; N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 346, § 1; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) § 2: 7-1; N.M.
Const., art. 6, § 23; N.Y. Judiciary Law, art. 2, § 2; N.D. Comp. Laws (1913) §
8514; Ohio Const., art. 4, § 7; Okla. Const., art. 7, § I I ; Ore. Const., art. 7, § 1;
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) §§ 2081, 2082, 2083, 2085; S.C. Code (1942) §
206; S.D. Const. art. 5, § 20; Tex. Const., art. 5, § 15; Utah Const., art. 8, § 17;
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eral jurisdiction are likewise courts 0£ record, this test alone cannot be
very significant. The fact that a probate cqurt is not a court of record
is a distinct indication that it is regarded as inferior.
Even though a probate court be termed a court of general or coordinate jurisdiction, in many cases appeals from it are taken to' the
courts of general jurisdiction and heard de nova. Behind this plan of
procedure on appeal lies a mistrust in probate courts, at least in contentious matters.141 In relation to the appellate court in this instance,
the probate court is an inferior court.142 And, even though the appeal
is not heard de novo, the inferiority, though not so pronounced, still
exists.
Another test to determine the status of a prqbate court is the extent
to which jurisdiction has been 'conferred upon it in probate matters.
As has been seen, the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts was to probate wills, grant letters and entertain suits for legacies; but the jurisdiction of probate cour.ts in America has not been so narrow. Probate
courts usually have power to hear and determine issues on disputed
claims, accountings, legacies, the sale of land to pay debts, partition of
land, and a multitude of matters relating to the management of the
estate. However, in some states resort must be had to the court of
general jurisdiction for the enforcement of claims, for authority to sell
land for the payment of debts or legacies, or for partition of lands. To
the extent that its jurisdiction is incomplete and resort must be had to
other courts, the probate court remains, in a sense, inferior.
Furthermore, .the functions of probate courts hav~ frequently been
combined with certain minor jurisdictions in civil and criminal matters
such as is exercised by county courts.148 At the same time, the qualifications of judges presiding over such combined courts have frequently
coincided with those required of judges of such inferior courts. A degradation of the probate court has resulted rather than an elevation of
the inferior court with which it was combined.
Finally the caliber of judicial personnel has not been unrelated to
the organization of courts and the respect which we have for them. A
Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) § 2719; Wash. Const., art 4, § II; W.Va. Const., art. 8, § 24;
Wis. Stat. (1943) § 253.08.
·
141 See PouND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 3 11 ( 1941).
142 "All courts from which an appeal lies are inferior courts, in relation to the
appellate court before which their- judgment may be carried; but they are not, therefore, inferior courts, in the technical sense of those words." Chief Justice Marshall
in Kempe's Lessee v. Kennedy, 5 Ci-anch (9 U.S.) 173 at 185 (1809).
148 POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 137, 180-;181 (1940).
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large portion of probate business in England receives the attention of
the chancellor, the vice-chancellors and judg~ of the common-la:w
courts, each of them eminently qualified for these tasks. In vesting all
probate jurisdiction in one court in America, we have lost sight of the
qualifications and ability possessed by English judges who have presided over probate matters. The qualifications for the office of judge of
county and other similar courts of an inferior status in this country have
been notoriously low; and qualifications for the office of probate judge
in a large number of states are not much higher. If a lay judge is allowed to preside over an inferior court, appeals with a trial de novo are
likely to be the answer to objections against lay personnel. Inefficiency
and loss of prestige are the prices paid for such a system. Administrative ability and a specialized legal knowledge on the part of modern
probate judges are indispensible qualifications necessary to bring the
American probate courts to a position fully equal to that of our courts
of general jurisdiction.1"'
·

C. General Survey of American Probate Courts
No single formula is adequate to describe the present-day organiza- ·
tion of probate courts in America. Furthermore, a single characterization of the probate court system of a given state would be an inaccurate
description in a number of instances. But, despite an inability to generalize broadly, some useful classifications are possible; and from these
classifications, some conclusions may be drawn with respect to the status,
the powers, and other incidents that an ideal probate court should
possess.
It is the purpose of this study to consider the present-day probate
court or courts of each state and appraise them in terms of their relation
to the court organization of that state. In making the classification that
is to follow it is obviously impossible to appraise all probate courts on
the basis of all the tests outlined above. Some one test alone must be
used as a yard stick. Most probate courts are now courts of record; 145
and in a substantial number of states there is the same presumption of
jurisdiction in favor of probate proceedings as is made in favor of courts
of general jurisdiction.146 If appeals from the probate court are taken
to the court of general jurisdiction, the former certainly occupies an
inferior position in relation to the latter; but if appeals lie to the same
144• See

VII and VIII infra.
See note 140 supra.
146
See notes 137 and 138 supra.

145
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tribunal as do appeals from the court of general jurisdiction, then the
two courts occupy coordinate positions. It is believed that this one
factor of the court to which an appeal lies from a probate court is the
most significant criterion in determining the position or status to be
ascribed to the latter. Consequently thfa one test is employed to the
exclusion of all others in the analysis which follows.
Without attempting to trace the history or development of probate courts in any state, it may be said generally ( and perhaps none
too accurately) that probate courts exist in four different forms in
the United States today. First, the most numerous group of states
has separate courts, but with definitely inferior attributes in the local
hierarchy of courts. This form of court exists in twenty-three jurisdictions and also has some kind of partial existence in ten other jurisdictions. Second, there is the system typified by California, where the
court of general jurisdiction embodies both the trial court and the probate court; in other words, there is combined in one judge and one
court the two functions of presiding over the ordinary trial court of
general jurisdiction and also of supervising the administration of probate matters. This unified system exists in nine states and prevails in
part in seven others. Third, there is the somewhat less numerous group
of states in which there exist separate probate courts, without the inferior status of those mentioned in the first category, but having a place
in the local court system more or less coordinate with the court of general jurisdiction. Appeals from their judgments are taken to the same
courts and in the same manner as are appeals from courts of general
jurisdiction. This form of court prevails in five states, and also has a
partial existence in six others. Fourth, there are a few states in which
probate matters are or may be committed to the jurisdiction of chancery--a legacy of the former English practice.
These variations within these four categories are sufficient to indicate the impossibility of generalizipg and, also, to warrant the observation that our present product of probate courts is the result of additions
and subtractions, impacts and influences, of each generation. Many of
these changes have been wrought in the interest of improving the efficiency and operation of probate courts; others have been made in the
interests of economy or for the avowed purposes of bringing the probate court closer to the people and thus making it more democratic;
or to make it available at all times. All of these may seem worthy ,
objectives in themselves, and they should be so considered as long as
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they are not made at the expense of efficiency and simplicity in the
administration of estates.
I.

Separate probate courts with inferior status

In about two-thirds of the states the probate court is a separate
court but relegated to an inferior position in the judicial organization
of those states. As already indicated, the separate probate court was an
early institution in America. The specialized nature of probate proceedings readily justified its separability. Furthermore, while it may
have been agreed that the transmission of property from one generation
to another required some judicial supervision, yet the process of effecting its transmission was so close and personal to the parties concerned
that some court with less of the technical procedure employed in trial
courts--a court which was open at all times 147 and where the parties
interested could go at any time and discuss their affairs in an informal
atmosphere 148--seemed a necessary part of every community. The
separate probate court in every county answered these requirements.140
But with this separate court in every county also came in most instances a relaxation of the qualifications of the probate judge. This
suggested the necessity of closer scrutiny and supervision over his judicial acts when dispute or contest arose. The supervision of uncontested
matters by a probate judge without legal training or judicial experience,
but with rights secured by an appeal, usually in the form of a trial de
novo before a court presided over by a judge adequately trained, became the established practice.150 This procedure of a trial de nova on
appeal from probate courts amounts to nothing less than a method of
control over their proceedings without the supervision of a competent
judge in the first instance. Thus created as inferior tribunals, there is
little incentive to improve their judicial position. A trial de nova in
the court of general jurisdiction on appeal is thought to be cheaper than
to have the affairs of the probate court directed by competent personnel
in the first instance. Twenty-six states m have created probate courts
147

Statutes in nearly all states provide that the probate court shall be open at all

times.
148

PouNo, ORGANIZATION OF CouRTS 262 ( 1940).
For a summary of this development see PouNo, ORGANIZATION OF CouRTS 136137, 250 (1940).
150
PouNo, ORGANIZATION oF CouRTS 140, 250 (1940).
:usi Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935) c. 46, § 168, c. 176 § 243; Conn. Gen.
Stat. (1930) § 5624; Ga. Code Ann. (Park, 1936) § 6-501; Idaho Code Ann. (1932)
§ 11-406 (unless errors of law appear on face of the record); Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith149

,
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in this image. In seven others 152 appeals lie to the court of general
jurisdiction upon ~he record- made in the probate court. This may imply
a little more confidence in the probate court. At least it eliminates the ·
necessity of a complete rehearing, but does not eliminate the court of
general jurisdiction as an intermediate court of appeal.
2.

Probate courts unified with courts of general jurisdiction

Under the California Constitution of I 849 158 the exercise of probate jurisdiction was conferred upon county courts. There were separate county courts in each county, but the state was divided into districts
with only one district judge for each district of several counties. It was
found that many county judges did not have sufficient work to keep
Hurd, 1941) c. 3, § 487; Kan. Gen. Stat. A~n. (Corrick, Supp. 1943) § 59-2408;
Ky. Civ. Code (Carroll, 1938) § 726; Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) c. 75, §§ 32, 36;
Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943) § 27.3178 (42); Minn. Stat. (1941) § 525.72; Mo. Rev.
Stat. Ann. (1942) § 291; Neb. Comp. Stat. Ann. (Dorsey, 1929) § 30-1606; N.H.
Rev. Laws (1942) c. 365, § II; N.M. Stat. ,4.nn. (1941) § 19-1001; N.D. Comp.
Laws Ann. (1913) §§ 8616, 8620 (unless on question of law alone); Ohio Gen. Code
Ann. (Page, 1937) §§ 12223-21, 12223-27 (if no record made of proceedings in
probate court); Okla. Const. art. 7, § 16; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1941) tit. 20, § 275;
Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) § 10-810; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20,
§ 2005 (on appeal from register of wills to orphans court); In re Geho's Estate, 33
Berks 43, affd. 340 Pa. 412, 17 A. (2d) 342 (1941); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. (1938)
c. 573, § l; McSoley v. Slepkow, 54 R.I. 374, 173 A. 124 (1934); Davis v. Higgins,
59 R.I. 339, 195 A. 495 (1937); S.D. Code (1939) § 35.2111; Tenn. Code Ann.
(Michie, 1938) § 9033; Tex. Rules Civ. Proc. (Supp. 1944) Rule 334; Vt. Pub.
Laws (1933) § 3016, as amended by Vt. Laws, 1941, No. 42, p. 53; Va. Code Ann.
(Michie, 1942) § 5249; Saunders v. Link, 114 Va. 285, 76 S.E. 327 (1912) (appeal
from clerk of circuit court); Wis. Stat. (1943) § 324.03 (on appeal to circuit court
from courts in counties of less than I 5,000 ,population).
In this study we have not attempted to study those statutes which provide for
probate jurisdiction to be exercised by other com:ts in exceptional cases. See, for
example, Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1941) c. 3, § 208, providing for administration
to be carried on in the county or circuit court in estates in which the probate judge
is interested; and Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) § 27-1204 providing for the probate in
, the circuit court in chancery of foreign wills not required to be probated in order to
be effective in the foreign jurisdiction. Such jurisdjction is the exceptional, not the
normal, one.
152
Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 7, §§ 783, 784; Del. Const., art. 4, §§ 33, 34;
Del. Rev. Code (1935) § 4418, 4419 (on record if taken, otherwise de novo); Fla.
Stat. Ann. (1943) §§ 61.01-61.07; 732.18; N.J. Prerogative Court Rules, No. 93
(1941 revision) (but court in its discretion may permit testimony not previously
available); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1943) §§ 1-274, 1-275; S.C. Code Ann.
(1942) § 231; Ex parte White, 33 S.C. 442, 12 S.E. 5 (1890); Sartor,v. -Fidelity &
Deposit Co., I 60 S.C. 390, I 58 S.E. 8 I 9 ( 193 I) ; W. Va. Code Ann. (Michie, I 93 7)
§§ 5763, 5764, 5765.
158
Cal. Const. of 1849, art. 6, §§ 5, 6.
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them busy at all times; and also that, when a district judge was needed
in civil or criminal matters, he was frequently far away in another
county and not readily accessible. It was observed that, frequently,
large estates came under the jurisdiction of the county courts and required able and capable supervision. Simple calculations were sufficient
to show that no substantial expense would be incurred if· a separate
judge were provided for each county and the jurisdiction of the-county
courts consolidated with that of the district courts. Accordingly, it was
proposed in the Constitutional Convention of 'r 878-79 to consolidate
these two courts and have a separate "superior court" and "superior
judge" for each county. Judicial ability, accessibility, responsiveness to
the local community, elimination of competition between the different
counties in the same district as to the selection of the judge-----all at no
increased expense-were believed to be thus available, although there
was some dissent voiced to these alleged advantages. Nevertheless,
after some debate,154 this plan was embodied in the California Constitution of I 879 155 and has been in operation since that date. Thus the
county courts were abolished and their jurisdiction transferred to the
newly created superior courts--courts of general jurisdiction.
The same system had been inaugurated in Nevada some fifteen
years earlier in the Constitution of I 864 156 and with hardly a dissenting
voice. The arguments in favor of the plan were succinctly stated in
the debates of the Nevada Constitutional Convention and are worth
restating here:

"In the first place, under such a system, we have all the judicial business done in the county which could be done by the District Judge and by the County Judge of that county; that is to say,
we have ample force on the bench, in each county, to discharge
all the duties that could be discharged in that county by the District and County Judges, and we have those duties performed, too,
more expeditiously, and more economically; and we, at the same
time, obviate the necessity of an appeal from the County Judge,
or, if you please, from the Justices of the Peace to the County
Judge, and from the County Judge to the District Judge, and
then again from the District Judge to the Supreme Court. We
rid ourselves of all this delay and difficulty by adopting this resolution, and thus we avoid, as it were, two intermediate stumblingDebates and Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of California,
1878-1879, pp. 972-976 (1881).
155
Cal. Const., art. 6, § 5.
156
Nev. Const. of 1864, art. 6, § 6.
15 4' 2
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blocks in the way of justice, wiping them out of our judicial
system altogether. In each of those inferior courts, expenses are
necessarily incurred, and time wasted by litigants, before they can
reach the court of final resort.
"Not only that, Mr. Chair.man, but if you adopt the system
proposed, you dignify the character of your judiciary in the several counties, and secure the respect of litigants for the courts, to
a degree which, I humbly submit, they do not always challenge at
the present time. Further than that, you also secure the services
on the bench, of men of ability-men in whom the community can
confide. You get men whose qualifications are known, coming
from the neighborhoods in which they are elected, and known to
all the citizens within their counties, and you avoid the great
struggle which, aside from political considerations, would always
be sure to arise, to a certain extent, under the old system of judicial districts comprising several counties in each, between the different counties of those respective districts, where men would
naturally be combatting and struggling oyer the question of which
county should present the candidate for District Judge." m
Whether California was influe!}c~d by the reform in Nevada is
not clear. At least no reference to the system already in operation in
Nevada is to be found. From the discussions on this proposed system,
it is probable that California was influenced solely by considerations
peculiar to itself.158
This plan of conferring probate jurisdiction upon the courts of
general jurisdiction was widely copied from California, especially in
the western states. In addition to California and Nevada, it has been
adopted in Montana,169 Utah,160 Washington,161 Wyoming,162 and Arizona.163 But this plan is not confined to the west. It also exists in
Iowa,164 Indiana,165 and Louisiana.166 Moreover, this system may be
157 Nevada

Constitutional Debates and Proceedings, 1864, p. 233 (1866).
Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of California,
1878-1879, pp. 972-976 (1881).
159 Mont. Const., art. 8, § II.
160 Utah Const., art. 24, § 9.
161 Wash. Const., art. 27, § 10.
_ 162 Wyo. Const., art. 5, § 10.
163 Ariz. Const., art. 6, § 6. In Arizona and California there is a separate court
and judge for each county. Other states in which probate m;:itters are handled by courts
of general jurisdiction, are divided into districts with one judge presiding over courts
in several counties except in the most populous places.
164 Iowa Code (Reichmann, 1939) §§ 10763, u819.
165 Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 4-303.
166 L a. Const., art. 7, § 3 5. ·
158 2
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said to prevail in Alabama 167 and New Mexico 168 insofar as an administration proceeding may be removed to the circuit or district courts of
those states. Insofar as a probate proceeding is under the supervision
of the circuit courts ( or the hustings courts or law and chancery courts
in certain cities) in Virginia 169 or of the superior courts in North Carolina,110 the same may be said of these courts. In a certain sense this is
also true in those counties of Oregon having a population of over 30,000 in which the probate court has been made a division of the circuit
court.171 In the three counties of Ohio in which the probate court has
been "consolidated" with the common pleas courts,172 there may be an
appearance of a unified court, but this is not so. The probate courts
there have neither been extinguished nor merged with the common
pleas courts. Rather there has been a union of the personnel of the
judge presiding over those two courts.178 Indeed a decision of the probate court may be reviewed de nova on appeal before the same judge
sitting as a common pleas judge.174
The old county courts in California in exercising their probate
jurisdiction had been regarded as courts of limited and special jurisdiction.175 What was the nature of this fusion with the court of general
jurisdiction? It has been described thus: "It may be said that the probate court is gone, but that the probate jurisdiction remains. And that
jurisdiction is now vested in the same court that exercises jurisdiction
in cases of law and equity." 176 In exercising that jurisdiction, however,
the court of general jurisdiction does not have general powers, but only
those powers formerly exercised by courts of probate. Except for the
power to exercise equitable jurisdiction as an incident of its probate
functions, the superior court in probate is entirely distinct from the
same court in a civil or criminal proceeding. It remains essentially a
probate court and must confine its movements to probate matters. A
remedy sought in the wrong side of the court may be as fatal as though
167 Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 13, §§ 138-144.
168 N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) §§ 16-312, 16-419, 16-420.
169 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) §§ 5247, 5360, 5910, 5914, 5920, 5935,
5947·

170 N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1943) §§ 28-30, 33-31.

171

Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) §§ 13-206, 13-207, 13-209, 93-310.

172 Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937) §§ 10501-47, 10501-50.
178 State ex rel. Sattler v. Cahill, 122 Ohio St. 354, 171 N.E. 595 (1930).
174

Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, Supp. 1943) § 10501-56.

175 Pryor v. Downey, 50 Cal. 388 at 400 (1875).
176

In re Estate of Davis, 136 Cal. 590 at 597, 69 P. 412 (1902).

IOOO

MICHIGAN LAW REV~EW

•

[ Vol. 42

sought in the wrong court.177 This same conception of divisible jurisdiction prevails also in Montana 178 and Wyoming.179
The Constitution of Washington, not unlike that of California,
provides that "the superior court shall have original jurisdiction in
all cases in ' equity arid in all cases at law . . . and all criminal
cases ·... of all matters of probate." 180 But it is said that "the Constitution does not make the superior courts probate courts. On the contrary
it vests the superior courts with jurisdiction of 'all matters of probate';
hence the court is not shorn of its general powers simply because the
cause before it may be one which was cognizable formerly in a court
of probate." 181 It has been repeatedly held that the superior court
sitting in probate matters loses none of its powers as a court of general
jurisdiction.182 It is said that "the constitution simply throws probate
matters into the aggregate jurisdiction of superior courts as courts of
general jurisdiction, to be exercised along with their other jurisdictional
177
In re Estate of Davis, 136 Cal. 590, 69 P. 412 (1902); In the Matter .of
Estate of McLellan, 8 Cal. (2d) 49, 63 P. (2d) II20 (1936) ;· Fisher v. Superior
Court, 23 Cal. App. (2d) 528, 73 P. (2d) 892 (1937). In the last case cited, a
proceeding to contest a will after probate was declared ineffectual because .filed in the
general, rather than the probate, jurisdiction of the superior court, as required by the
California probate code. This means that only probate matters must be tried on the
probate side and non-probate matters on the non-probate side of the court. Three
cases may seem to violate this principle: In re Thompson's Estate, IOI Cal. 349, 35
P. 991 (1894); In re Clary's Estate, II2 Cal. 292, 44 P. 569 (1896); and In re
Riccomi's Estate, 185 Cal. 458, 197 P. 97 (1921). In each of these cases, however,
relief essentially equitable· in nature was sought on the probate side of the co_urt,
whereas it should have been sought on the equity side of the court. The estate of a
deceased person was involved in each case which probably accounts for the mistaken
choice of forum. Nevertheless in each instance the parties submitted and the matter
was tried as an equitabJe matter and the adjudication upheld. The pleadings also
supporte_d the equity jurisdiction which justified the court in ignoring the fact that
the remedy was formally sought under the probate jurisdiction. If the parties had
objected before trial, however, a different result might have been obtained. See
Hampshire v. Woolley, 72 Utah 106, 269 P. 135 (1928) as an example of this
procedure.
178 In re Sprigg's Estate, 68 Mont. 92, 216 P. II08 (1923); State ex rel. Hahn
v. District Court, 83 Mont. 400, 272 P. 525 (1928).
179
Church v. Quiner, 31 Wyo. 222, 224 P. 1073 (1924).
180
Wash. Const., art. 4, § 6.
181
Reformed Presbyterian Church v. McMillan, 31 Wash. 643 at 646-647, 72
P. 502 (1903).
182
,
State ex rel. Keasal v. Superior Court, 76 Wash. 291, 136 P. 147 (1913);
In re Martin's Estate, 82 Wash. 226, 144 P. 42 (1914); State ex rel. Neal v. Kauffman, 86 Wash. 172, 149 P. 656 (1915); In re Wren's Estate, 163 Wash. 65, 299 P.
972 (1931); In re Kelley, 193 Wash. 109, 74 P. (2d) 904 (1938).
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powers, legal and equitable, and as a part of those general powers." 188
This unitary notion of the superior court has likewise been followed in
Oregon,18" Utah,185 and Arizona.186
This conception of jurisdiction has several noteworthy consequences. For many purposes the line of demarcation between the equity
and probate jurisdiction of the court need not be observed. In either
case it is in the same court and before the same judge. Thus the court
of general jurisdiction may do many things in connection with a probate proceeding that would otherwise have required a separate action
or proceeding addressed to its non-probate side. It can construe a
183

State ex rel. Keasal v. Superior' Court, 76 Wash. 291 at 298, 136 P. 147

(1913).
18
" In re Will of Pittock, 102 Ore. 159, 199 P. 633, 202 P. 216 (1921); In
re Faling's Estate, II3 Ore. 6, 228 P. 821, ~31 P. 148 (1924). This is confined to
those counties in Oregon now having a population in excess of 30,000 and in which
probate jurisdiction is vested in the circuit courts, department of probate. In the
first case cited the court construed a will and decided a will contest in the same proceeding. In the second case it allowed attorneys' fees in connection with a will contest,
which could not have been done had the court had jurisdiction solely over probate
matters. The court said that its mode of proceeding was in the nature of a suit in
equity. Completeness of administration in one proceeding was the objective.
185
In Utah it is said: "We therefore have no courts which are known as probate
courts, or as law courts, or as equity courts; but we have courts possessed of general
original jurisdiction, which are known as district courts. The district courts of this
state, therefore, administer the estates of decedents as a part of their original jurisdiction, the same as they hear and enter judgments on promissory notes, or enter
decrees in equity, foreclosing mortgages or quieting titles." Weyant v. Utah Savings
& Trust Co., 54 Utah 181 at 204, 182 P. 189 (1919). Other cases implying or
holding that the court's jurisdiction is independent of the nature of the subject matter
are: In re Tripp's Estate, 51 Utah 359 at 363, 170 P. 975 (1918); In re Reiser's
Estate, 57 Utah 434 at 440, 195 P. 317 (1921); In re Agee's Estate, 69 Utah 130,
252 P. 891 (1927); In re Thompson's Estate, 72 Utah 17 at 32-35, 269 P. 103
(1927). But see Hampshire v. Woolley, 72 Utah 106, 269 P. 135 (1928) where
a writ of prohibition was granted to restrain exercise of non-probate jurisdiction by
district court sitting in probate; In re Rogers' Estate, 75 Utah 290, 284 P. 992 (1930)
where the pleadings were held insufficient to invoke the non-probate jurisdiction of
the court sitting in probate.
In In re McLaren's Estate, 99 Utah 340 at 346-47, 106 P. (2d) 766 (1940)
the question of the power of a district court sitting in probate to pass upon a nonprobate matter was held waived by the parties. The court said that the proper procedure "when a contested question arises in a probate proceeding involving the determination of disputed facts, is to strike the matters from the probate calendar and transfer it to
the calendar of civil cases to be heard and determined as a contested civil matter..•.
The matter of transferring a cause from the probate calendar to a civil clendar in the
same court is not a matter of jurisdiction but one of procedure."
186
Estate of Hannerkam, 51 Ariz. 447, 77 P. (2d) 814 (1938) in which the
district court in an action in which administratrix was substituted as party plaintiff
approved a settlement of the action, which it could only do under its probate power. .
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will 1 81 or make partition of property,188 even though not essential to
the exercise of its probate jurisdiction. But, where the matter is one in
which there is a right to trial by jury, it must not be impaired by calling
it a probate matter-in which there is ordinarily no right to a jury
trial.189 The fusion of probate with law and equity cannot so easily
abolish their essential differences. Furthermore courts must be ever
alert not to proceed by citation or publication against a person in an
alleged probate proceeding-a proceeding in rem-and end up by a
judgment or decree in personam, for such may violate the requirement
of due process.190

3. Separate Probate Courts but Coordinate with Those of
General Jurisdiction
Several developments in Massachusetts have resulted in a profound
change in the essential character of the probate court in. that state. By
a statute in 18 62 191 the probate courts were made courts of record. In
1891 another statute 192 made them "courts of superior and general
jurisdiction with reference to all cases and matters in which they have
jurisdiction." The method of accomplishing this was not left to a mere
designation. The statute indicates how this is to be done, viz., by a
presumption "in favor of the proceedings of the probate courts as would
187
Reformed Presbyterian Church v. McMillan, 3 I Wash. 643 at 646-647, 72
P. 502 (1903).
188
In re Wren's Estate, 163 Wash. 65, 299 P. 972 (1931).
180 Id.
190
The importance of keeping this distinction clear is well brought out in In
re McLaren's Estate, 99 Utah 340 at 354-355, ro6 P. (2d) 766 (1940) in which
the court said: "But again, warning should be sounded regarding the situation where
a civil case is tried as a probate matter and probate matter tried as a civil case when
they are respectively purely matters cognizable only as civil and as probate. It is one
thing to determine a civil matter as a probate matter or a probate matter as a civil case
and quite another thing to try a probate matt~r as a probate matter and a civil case as
a civil case, although they may be addressed to the wrong divisions of the court. The
first is a matter of substance; the second a matter of labels and ministerial adjustment.
• • • The probate division by virtue of its jurisdiction of the estate and the heirs for
general purposes of administration could not in probate proceedings wherein the partr
was served by the mailing to him of a probate notice of the contest, have given judgment against him in a matter essentially civil in its nature." See also In re Martin's
Estate, 82 Wash. 226, 144 P. 42 (1914); and In re Kelley, 193 Wash. 109, 74 P.
(2d) 904 (1938).
191 Mass. Acts and Resolves, 1862, c. 68, p. 56, now Mass. Stat. Ann. (Michie,
1932) C. 215, § l.
192
Mass. Acts and Resolves, 1891, c. 415, § 4, now Mass. Stat. Ann. (Michie,
1932) c. 215, § 2; and see Commissioners' Report (Mass.) for Consolidating Public
Statutes, notes on c. 162, §§ 2, 8 (1901) .
·

1 944}

1003

PROBATE CouRTS

be made in favor of the proceedings of the other courts of superior and
general jurisdiction." Both of these changes were in the right direction,
but still the procedure on appeal was left untouched. Trials de novo
on appeal remained before one justice of the Supreme Judicial Court
under whose direction there could even be a trial by jury. Final appeal from the decision of the single justice was heard before the full
Supreme Judicial Court sitting as the Supreme Court of Probate.198
Finally in 1920 appeals were taken directly to the full bench of the
Supreme Judicial Court.194 The hearing before the single justice was
eliminated. And the appeal has been since treated as an appeal in a
suit in equity under the general equity jurisdiction.195 Questions of fact
as well as of law are considered with respect to the evidence given in
the probate court.196 Thus the procedure on an appeal from the probate
court was substantially as from the superior courts, i.e., on the record
made in the court below and without a trial de novo.107 This last step
was the most fruitful in elevating probate courts to a stature fully
coordinate with that of the superior courts in Massachusetts.
Several other states have felt that the character of probate proceedings was such as not only to justify separate probate courts, but also
that their function was of such moment that they be given the same
standing as courts of general jurisdiction. Thus in Pennsylvania the
orphans' courts are courts of record; 198 and their proceedings are entitled to the same recognition and presumptions of validity as those of
common pleas courts; 199 and appeals are prosecuted to the superior
or supreme court in the same manner as are appeals from the common
pleas courts.200
In New York substantially the same comparison may be made. The
surrogates' courts are courts of record,201 and their proceedings and
decrees are entitled to a presumption of regularity and validity.202 Ap193 NEWHALL, SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES AND FIDUCIARY LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS,

§ 250 (1937).
Mass. Stat. Ann. (Michie, l 93 2) c. 2 l 5, § 9 et seq.
Ibid.
196
ld. c. 215, § 12.
194
195

197 NEWHALL, SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES AND FIDUCIARY

LAw

IN MAssAcHusErn,

§ 250 note 4 (1937).
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, §§ 2081, 2082, 2083, 2085.
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, § 2085.
200
Pa.Stat.Ann. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 17, §§ 181,185; tit. 12, §§ 1091, 1107.
201
N.Y. Judiciary Law, (McKinney, l 939) art. 2, § 2.
202
N.Y. Surrogates' Court Act (Cahill, 1937) § 43. See also O'Conner v.
Huggins, 113 N.Y. 511 (1889).
198
199
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peals lie to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, in the same
manner as from the Supreme Court.208
A similar summary may be made in Maryland. The orphans' court
is a court of record; 20 ¼ appeals are taken directly to the Court of Appeals of Maryland where they are heard ·on the record made in the
orphans' court.205
The administration of probate matters in New Jersey by the surrogate's court, the orphans' court, and the prerogative court has already
been detailed. Appeals from orphans' courts .lie to the prerogative
court and from the latter to the court of errors and appeals.206 The
common pleas courts are the courts of general jurisdiction and appeals
from them lie to the supreme court and from the latter to the court of
errors and appeals. 201 In this respect, the orphans' courts may be termed
coordinate with the common pleas courts.
The probate co:urts of Ohio, like the common pleas courts, are
courts of record,208 and are accorded a presumption in favor of their
proceedings.209 Appeals lie directly to the courts of appeals in the same
manner as do appeals from the coinmon pleas courts,210 unless no record
was made of the proceeding in the probate court, in which case appeals
are heard de novo in the common pleas court 211 from which an appeal
will then lie to the court of appeals. To the extent that appeals lie and
are taken to the courts of appeal directly from probate courts, the latter
are coordinate with the common pleas courts; but, to the extent that
no record is made in the probate court and appeals are taken to the
common pleas courts with a trial de nova, the probate courts are definitely of an inferior status.
In Wisconsin probate matters come l.illder the jurisdiction of the
county courts,212 which also handle a limited amount of civil and crimi. nal matters in some counties under special legislation.218 These courts
are courts of record}214 In counties having a population of r4,ooo or
N.Y. Surrogates' Court Act (Cahill, Supp. 1943) § 288.
Md. Const., art. 4, § l.
Md. Code Ann. (Flack, 1939) art. 5, §§ 64, 66.
206
N.J. Rev. Stat. ( 1937) § 2:30-16.
201
N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §§ 2:27-355, 2:27-350.
208
Ohio Const., art. 4, § 7.
209
Shroyer v. Richmond, 16 Ohio St. 455 {1866).
210
Ohio Gen. Code Ann. {Page, Supp. 1943) § 10501-56.
211 Ibid.
212
Wis: Stat. (1943) § 253.01.
218
Wis. Stat. (1943) App. p. 8.
214
Wis. Stat. (1943) § 253.08.
208

20

'
205
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more the county judge must be a member of the bar or have previously
occupied the office of probate judge.215 In other counties no such qualifications are required. A layman may be county judge.216 Appeals from
counties having a population of more than r 5,ooo lie to the Supreme
Court; 217 in the remaining twelve counties appeals lie to the circuit
court with a trial de novo.218 In the former case, the hearing on appeal
is on the record of the proceedings in the county court, and otherwise
has the same procedure as do appeals from circuit courts.219 Thus in
counties having a population of more than r 5,ooo the county courts
occupy a position coordinate with the circuit courts in the matter of
appeals. In other counties, their position may only be described as
inferior.
·
In Indiana administration of decedents' estates is had in the circuit
courts by circuit judges for the most part,220 similar to the California
system. In Marion 221 and Vanderburgh 222 counties, however, separate
probate courts have been created and designated as courts of record.228
Appeals from the circuit court in probate matters lie to the supreme
court or one of the courts of appeals.224 As might be expected the appeal
is not heard de nova but on the record, since the matter originally was
heard by a circuit judge. Similarly appeals from these two separate
probate courts lie to the supreme court or a court of appeals.225 Thus
these two probate courts may be said to have the same standing as circuit courts in Indiana.
In the District of Columbia there is a separate probate term each
year of the United States District Court there.226 That term of court
is presided over by the district judge. Nevertheless there is a separate
probate court, with a union of personnel.227 Appeals are taken to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in the
2

Wis. Stat. (1943) § 253.02.
Wis. Stat. (1943) § 253.02, except in counties where civil or criminal jurisdiction has been conferred upon county courts..
217
Wis. Stat. (1943) § 324.01.
218 Ibid.
219
Wis. Stat. (1943) § 324.04.
220
Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 4-303.
221
Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 4-2901.
222
lnd. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 4-3001.
228
Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §§ 4-2902, 4-3002.
224
lnd. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §§ 4-214, 6-2001.
225
Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §§ 2-3218, 2-3222, 2-3223.
226
D.C. Code (1940) § 11-501.
227 Ibid.
.
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same manner as appeals from the district court.228 Hence the probate
court for the District of Columbia is fully coordinate with the district
court there.
' In Tennessee the chancery courts have concurrent jurisdiction with
the county court to appoint an administrator six months after the decedent's death. 220 The county courts have concurrent jurisdiction with
the chancery and circuit courts in proceedings to sell real estate of decedents, and for distribution and partition.230 Appeals fro_m the county
courts lie to the circuit courts with a trial de novo 231 except that, if the
jurisdiction of the county court in the matter appealed from is concurrent with that of chancery and circuit courts, an appeal lies directly
to the court of appeals or supreme court.232 Insofar as appeals from the
county court lie directly to the court of appeals or suprem:e court, the
former may be termed coordinate with the courts of general jurisdiction in the present classification.
A Vermont statute provides that appeals from probate courts lie
directly to the supreme court on questions of law,238 but otherwise to
the county courts.284 To the extent that appeals lie directly to the supreme court, the probate courts of Vermont are coordinate with the
courts of general jurisdiction.
. In Illinois, appeals from a final order of the probate court in a
proceeding for the sale of real estate lie to the appellate or supreme
court of that state,235 rather than to the circuit courts. In this one instal).ce, probate courts in Illinois are clearly coordinate with those of
general jurisdiction.
In each of the first five states discussed here, probate proceedings
are .believed to be of such a character and volume as to justify a separate probate court substantially on a par with those of general jurisdiction. Certainly in Massachusetts, New York and Pennsylvania, and
· in certain communities of New Jersey, Maryland and Ohio, the population and amount of probate business is large enough to warrant the
establishment of separate courts.
D.C. Code (1940) § 17-101.
Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) § '10382.
230
Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) §§ 8263, 10326, 10380.
ui Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) §§ 9028, 9033, 9060.
232
Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) §§ 9029, 9059.
288
Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) § 3001.
234
Vt. Pub. 'Laws (1933) § 3002.
285
Ill. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1941) c. 3, § 486.
228

229
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4. Probate Matters Handled in Chancery
In most states the aid of chancery may be sought only when the
power of the probate court is insufficient for the desired end. In Alabama any person interested in an estate may, at any time prior to final
settlement, take the proceeding into chancery. Even under the early
decisions of that state, no reason need be given. It was a matter of
absolute right.286 This was probably a broader jurisdiction than was
exercised by English chancery courts over decedents' estates. In I 9 I 5
this was embodied ·in a statute there. 287 Under the present practice an
estate may be removed either to the circuit court 238 or to c;hancery.289
In effect then, there is concurrent jurisdiction in the probate, circuit
and chancery courts to administer estates in Alabama.
In Mississippi jurisdiction over probate matters in the county courts
was abandoned in r890 and conferred entirely upon the chancery
courts.240 This put probate jurisdiction in a court which had exercised
it upon special occasions previously and which had ample equipment'
and personnel capable of the new task assigned to it. Furthermore, it
eliminated any question as to the amount of equity powers possessed
by the probate court or whether the circumstances of a particular administration proceeding warranted the intervention of chancery.ui
Prior to r939 there were separate probate courts in Arkansas. By
a constitutional amendment, effective January r, r939, the judges of
the chancery courts have been given the added duty of presiding over
the probate courts.242 It is said that the probate courts have not lost
their identity by such consolidation, but that they remain probate courts
in chancery.248 However, the effect of transferring this function to the
judges of the chancery courts cannot be merely formal; it will likely
import into probate proceedings some of the equitable practices and
doctrines known and practiced in courts of chancery.
In addition to these three states where chancery has a hand regularly in the administration of probate matters, there are numerous situ286
See S1Ms, CHANCERY PLEADING AND PRACTICE IN ALABAMA, § 658 (1909)
and cases there cited.
237
Ala. Acts, 1915, p. 738.
2188
Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 13, §§ 138, 139.
239
Ala. Const., art. 6, § 149.
240
Miss. Const., art. 6, § 159•
.ui Some idea of the extent as to the uncertainty of equity powers possessed by
probate courts is described in PouND, ORGANIZATION OF CouRTS 140 (1940).
242
Ark. Const., Amend. 24; Ark. Acts, 1939, act 3, p. 6.
HS Lewis v. Smith, 198 Ark. 244, 129 S.W. (2d) 229 (1939).
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ations that arise in the administration of estates where it is thought that
the machinery of probate courts is inadequate to deal with the problem;
and that because of special circumstances, the invocation of equity jurisdiction is justified. This is an established practice in most states at the
present time. The occasions for this special jurisdiction of equity over
the administration of estates are not within the primary purpose of this
study and cannot, therefore, be treated here. 244

(To be concluded in the August issue of the Review)
2

-1-1 As to the jurisdiction of equity to administer estates, see I WoERNER, AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., § 156 (1923); "Equitable Jurisdiction of
Probate Courts and Finality of Probate Decrees," 48 YALE L. J. 1273 (1939).

